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Changes in the relationship between
self-reference and emotional valence
as a function of dysphoria
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1School of Psychology, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK
2Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, Scotland, UK
The self-positivity bias is found to be an aspect of normal cognitive function. Changes in
this bias are usually associated with changes in emotional states, such as dysphoria or
depression. The aim of the present study was to clarify the role of emotional valence
within self-referential processing. By asking non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals to
rate separately the emotional and self-referential content of a set of 240 words, it was
possible to identify the differences in the relationship between self-reference and
emotional valence, which are associated with dysphoria. The results support the
existence of the self-positivity bias in non-dysphoric individuals. More interestingly,
dysphoric individuals were able to accurately identify the emotional content of the
word stimuli. They failed, however, to associate this emotional valence with self-
reference. These findings are discussed in terms of attributional self-biases and their
consequences for cognition.
Many investigators have examined how people preferentially process and encode
emotional information that is relevant to the self (Miall, 1986). When investigators have
considered the valence of stimuli, they have found that, in healthy individuals, there is a
close relationship between the processing of self-reference and the valence of
personality traits (Pahl & Eiser, 2005). Many studies conducted across a range of
different contexts show that individuals tend to view themselves through rose-tinted
lenses (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). A meta-analysis
investigating the positivity bias in attribution research suggests that individuals tend to
attribute positive traits or outcomes to internal, stable and global personal
characteristics, whereas negative traits or outcomes are identified as unrelated to
personal characteristics (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).
Individuals rate themselves as possessing more positive personality traits and
displaying more positive behaviours than an average peer. In contrast, individuals
rate themselves as having less negative personality traits and negative behavioural
characteristics than others (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Messick, Bloom,
Blodizar, & Samuelson, 1985). This self-positivity bias is one of the most common
and robust findings within social psychology (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama,
1999) and illustrates the close relationship between self-reference and emotional
valence.
Is there a self-negativity bias in depression?
Several researchers have proposed that psychopathology is associated with changes
in the self-positivity bias (Alloy, Albright, Abramson, & Dykman, 1990; Mezulis et al.,
2004). Sweeny, Anderson, and Bailey (1986) found that the self-serving positivity
bias is reversed in depressed populations, whereby negative events are associated
with internal, stable and global causes. Effect sizes of the self-negativity bias are
smaller in dysphoric university students than in psychiatric depressives.
In two seminal studies, Kuiper and Derry (1982) and Bradley and Mathews
(1983) examined the differences in the processing of positive and negative
personality traits across both non-depressed and depressed individuals within a self-
referential context. The self-reference effect refers to the phenomenon that
individuals have better recall for information presented in a self-referent context
when compared with information presented in other-referent and semantic contexts
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). Both studies found that non-depressed participants
showed a significant bias within the self-referent condition for positive information
supporting the positivity bias found in attribution research. The results were less
consistent for depressed individuals. Kuiper and Derry reported the self-referent
effect; however, increased recall was found for both positive and negative
adjectives. In contrast, Bradley and Mathews found a complete reversal of the self-
positivity bias in depressed individuals. Similar to Sweeny et al. (1986) within the
self-referent condition, Bradley and Mathews found increased recall for
negative adjectives only. These differences could be accounted for by differences
in the measure of depression used in each study. The participants in the study
conducted by Kuiper and Derry were dysphoric university students with a score of
9 or greater on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), whereas the participants in
the Bradley and Mathews study were individuals with a current clinical diagnosis of
depression.
Segal, Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, and Horowitz (1995) examined the effect of
self-reference and emotional valence on Stroop interference. They included a
priming methodology in which target Stroop words were presented after a positive
or negative and unrelated or related priming sentence. They found that depressed
participants showed longer colour-naming latencies for self-descriptive negative
targets than any other prime–target combinations. The authors suggest that for
depressed individuals, self-related negative information represents a highly accessible
and interconnected schema. Taken together, these findings suggest that the self-
positivity bias is found to be altered or even reversed at both social and cognitive
levels. The results of Bradley and Mathews (1983) and Segal et al. (1995) illustrate
the accessibility of self-negative information in depression and suggest that changes
in the self-positivity bias are associated with changes in mood states, such as
dysphoria or depression.
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Current research
Several researchers have examined the relationship between self-reference and emotion
in more detail in non-dysphoric individuals by investigating the differences in the self-
positivity bias in traits rated as extreme or moderate in emotional content (Pahl & Eiser,
2005), the underlying cognitive basis of the self-positivity bias (Sedikides and Green,
2004) and brain regions associated with self-related processing (Craik et al., 1999;
Fossati et al., 2003, 2004; Kelley et al., 2002). More recently, a study conducted by
Moran et al. (2006) acknowledged the importance of emotional valence within self-
referential judgments. They examined the processing of positive and negative
personality traits in relation to the ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ judgments made within a self-
referential context. In line with the self-positivity bias, individuals responded faster to
self-positive and non-self-negative information. Regions of the brain were also found to
be active within the self-positivity bias. Moran et al. proposed that a functional hierarchy
exists within the brain to process both affective and cognitive components of the self.
However, to date, in all of these studies, the effect of emotional valence was measured
on self-reference indirectly, either through a rating of self-reference, by the extent to
which words were recalled or the extent of Stroop interference. With the role of
emotional valence becoming increasingly central for the study of the self, it is important
to directly address both the role of emotion within self-reference and the relationship
between self-reference and emotion within different mood states.
The present study
The aims of the present study are twofold: first, to replicate the findings of previous
studies by identifying the self-positivity bias found in non-dysphoric individuals and,
second, to further investigate how the relationship between self-reference and emotion
changes as a function of mood state. It is predicted that the relationship between the
self-referential and emotional content of words will differ across dysphoric and non-
dysphoric groups. In non-dysphoric individuals, there is expected to be a strong positive
relationship between words rated in a self-referential and emotional context (Moran
et al., 2006; Mezulis et al., 2004; Alicke et al., 1995; Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989;
Messick et al., 1985). In dysphoric individuals, it is predicted that this relationship will
be altered. Based on the previous literature, both strong and weak levels of this
prediction can be made. The strong prediction states that the relationship between self-
reference and emotion will be reversed in individuals experiencing elevated levels of
negative mood (Sweeny et al., 1986; Bradley & Mathews, 1983), such that negative
words will be rated as self-referent and positive words as non-self-referent. The weak
prediction states that no relationship will exist between the words presented in both a
self-referential and an emotional context (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Mezulis et al., 2004).
It is anticipated that the relationship between self-reference and emotion will differ
as a function of mood state as in the studies described above. In previous research, the
effect of self-reference was measured directly, whereas the effect of emotional valence
indirectly. Because of the design of these studies, it is difficult to separate the effects of
self-relevance and emotional valence. In the present study, we aim to resolve this
problem.We asked individuals to rate both the self-referential content and the emotional
valence of a set of word stimuli. This allows us to obtain separate ratings of the two
variables and analyse them individually. In doing so, firstly, we shall be able to identify
the relationship between self-reference and emotion in non-dysphoric individuals,
providing support for previous research. Then by utilizing this new design, it will be
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possible to determine which components of the self-reference and emotion variables are
altered and therefore contribute to the change in relationship between self-reference
and emotion found in dysphoric mood states. This will extend our understanding of
how this relationship changes as a function of negative mood.
Methods
Design and overview
The study consisted of two phases: (1) a pilot study to obtain suitable word stimuli, and
(2) an experimental study to compare dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals.
All participants completed the revised Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS). The DAS was included for a separate study and will
not be discussed further. Participants were also asked to rate the self-referential (‘like
me’–‘not like me at all’) and emotional content (positive–negative) of words using two
separate five-point Likert scales.
Word stimuli
The pilot study
Initially, the pilot study was conducted in order to obtain a set of word stimuli, which
varied across both self-referential (‘like me’–‘not like me at all’) and emotional (positive–
negative) dimensions. Three hundred ninety-five words were selected for use, compiled
from sets of words used in previous research (Brittlebank, Scott, & Williams, 1993;
Green & McKenna, 1996; Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1998; Ridout, 2005).
Four hundred fifty-seven university students (341 females, mean ¼ 20.03 years,
SD ¼ 3:71) rated the emotional (positive, neutral or negative) and self-referential (like
me or not like me) content of 50 of the 395 words on two separate five-point Likert
scales. The results of Pearson’s correlation revealed a strong correlation between
emotion and self-reference (rð394Þ ¼ :92, p , :001), suggesting that words which were
rated as positive were also rated as self-referent and words which were rated as negative
were rated as non-self-referent.
Although this strong correlation supports the self-positivity bias identified in
previous research (Alicke et al., 1995; Mezulis et al., 2004), it also limits the breadth of
the word stimuli set. It was not possible to obtain sets of word stimuli in which words
were rated as self-referent and negative or non-self-referent and positive by all
participants. Therefore, word ratings of dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants will
only be compared across the three word groups identified: (1) self-referent and positive,
(2) neutral, and (3) non-self-referent and negative. Each word group consisted of 80
words, and word frequency, word length and grammatical word type were controlled
for in each group.
The experimental study
A questionnaire booklet was developed with 240 words. Each word was presented with
two five-point Likert scales. The emotion scale was presented with the anchors
‘positive’, ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’. The self-reference scale was presented with the
anchors ‘like me’ and ‘not like me at all’. These anchors were alternated between the
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one and five end-points of the scales. Two versions of the questionnaire were created to
control for word order effects.
Participants
Forty-two participants took part in the experimental phase. Participants were classified
into dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups on the basis of their score in the BDI-II
questionnaire. Participants with a score below 7 were classified as non-dysphoric
(N ¼ 10, 7 females, mean ¼ 20.5 years, SD ¼ 2:82) and those with a score above 15
were classified as dysphoric (N ¼ 17, 13 females, mean ¼ 22.69 years, SD ¼ 6:49).
Fifteen participants who scored within the range of 7–15 were excluded from further
analyses. These high cut-off points were used in order to obtain purely non-dysphoric
and dysphoric groups. Raising the cut-off score reduces the number of false-positive
participants within a population sample (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). All participants
spoke English as per the university entrance requirements.
Procedure
Participants were provided with the booklet and instructed to rate each of the 240
words on two five-point scales. Participants were first asked to rate the emotional
content of each word (positive–negative), and were then asked to rate the self-
referential content of each word (‘like me’–‘not like me at all’). A general definition of
self-reference was provided ‘The word can relate to any aspect of your life, work,
leisure, your past or it may explain a personality trait’. All participants were debriefed as
to the nature of the study on completion.
One half of the participants completed the questionnaire booklet (BDI-II, DAS) prior




Statistical analyses were conducted to identify any possible confounds between the two
groups in terms of participant variables. Chi-squared analyses revealed no significant
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups for gender (xð1Þ ¼ 0:14, ns)
or nationality (xð3Þ ¼ 0:67, ns). A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant age
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups (Fð1; 18Þ ¼ 0:105, ns).
A comparison of the relationship between self-reference and emotion in normal
individuals and dysphoric individuals
In order to replicate the findings of previous studies and investigate the relationship
between self-reference and emotion differences, the correlation coefficients for self-
reference and emotion were calculated for each individual participant using Pearson’s R.
These coefficients were then transformed into z-statistics using Fisher’s r to z
transformation. The mean correlation coefficient was then calculated for each group
and converted back into r prior to comparison. Fisher’s r to z transformation was used as
it has been found to reduce the variability associated with using multiple correlations
(Corey, Dunlap, & Burke, 1998). A statistical comparison devised by Fisher (1921) was
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used to compare the two independent correlation coefficients. The method was taken
from Howell (2002). The difference between the two correlations approaches
significance (z ¼ 1:36, p ¼ :083).
To examine this difference further, the correlations for each group were also
examined independently. In the non-dysphoric group, a positive correlation was found
between self-reference and emotion (rð9Þ ¼ :63, p , :05). Positive words were more
often rated as self-referent and negative words as non-self-referent. No correlation was
identified between self-reference and emotion in the dysphoric group (rð16Þ ¼ :10, ns).
Differences in the way in which non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals identify with
emotionally valenced information
To examine the differences identified in the above correlations in more detail, two 2
(participant group) £ 3 (word group) mixed ANOVAs were performed on the self-
reference and emotion ratings, respectively. The factor participant group consisted of
two levels (dysphoric and non-dysphoric) and the factor word group consisted of three
levels (positive, neutral and negative).
Emotion
The results of the 2 £ 3 mixed ANOVA for emotion identified a main effect of word
group Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 69:01, p , :001. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction
reveal that the mean word ratings of all the three word groups significantly differed from
each other. Both participant groups rated positive words (4.09) as highly positive and
negative words (1.83) as highly negative when compared with neutral words (3.13). No
other effects or interactions were identified (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric word ratings of emotion content (error bars represent
standard error).
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Self-reference
The results of the 2 £ 3 mixed ANOVA for self-reference show a main effect of word
group Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 12:54, p , :001. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction
reveal that positive words (3.27) are rated as high as ‘like me’ on the Likert scale and
negative words (2.68) as low as ‘not like me at all’ on the Likert scale when compared
with neutral words (2.94). All word groups significantly differed from each other
( p , :05). No main effect of participant group was identified. However, an interaction
between participant and word groups (Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 11:94, p , :001) was found. Post hoc
analyses in the form of twowithin-group ANOVAswere performed on the non-dysphoric
and dysphoric participants’ word ratings, respectively. Non-dysphoric participants rated
all positive (3.47), negative (2.32) and neutral (2.95) word groups as significantly
different from each other ( p , :05). In contrast, no significant differences were
identified between any of the three word groups for dysphoric individuals (Figure 2).
Discussion
The results support the hypothesis that the relationship between self-reference and
emotion differs across non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals. As predicted, a positive
correlation was found between self-reference and emotion in non-dysphoric individuals.
Positive words were rated as self-referent and negative words as non-self-referent.
The weak prediction, that no relationship would exist between self-reference and
emotion, was supported in dysphoric individuals (Alloy et al., 1990; Mezulis et al.,
2004). Importantly, further analyses indicated that it is the differences in the processing
of self-reference, not emotional valence, which are associated with differences in mood
state. Non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals rate the emotional content of words in
the same way. However, dysphoric individuals fail to associate self-reference with
Figure 2. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric word ratings of self-referential content (error bars represent
standard error).
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emotional valence. The findings suggest that dysphoric individuals can still identify the
emotional valence of stimuli accurately. However, it is their evaluation of this valence
within a self-referential context which is altered.
Several studies support the lack of an emotional association with self-identity in
the context of dysphoria and depression. Kuiper and Derry (1982) found that recall
within the self-referent condition, compared with the other-referent condition, was
increased across both positive and negative stimuli. More recently, in a study of
dysphorics, Smallwood (2004) utilized a word fragment task to examine self-reference
and ambiguity. He found that dysphoric individuals used self-referent items to
complete a word fragment task independently of the emotional tone of the stimuli.
Finally, a study by Timbremont and Braet (2004) found that never depressed and
remitted depressed children endorsed more positive adjectives as self-related, whereas
currently depressed children endorsed equal numbers of positive and negative traits.
These findings, and those of the present study, indicate that the context of self-
reference (‘does this word describe me?’) automatically activates the self-schema, and
that emotional processing within this context is altered in dysphoria. More generally,
these findings may indicate that dysphoria is associated specifically with changes in
the sense of self, rather than with changes in all aspects of emotional processing.
Dysphoric individuals may not define their self-identity through emotion in the same
way as non-dysphorics.
Finally, two methodological points need to be addressed. The first point is the
distinction between self-negativity and attenuated self-positivity biases identified in
previous research. As stated previously, Sweeny et al. (1986) identified a self-negativity
attributional bias in depressed individuals; in contrast, Mezulis et al. (2004) examined
attribution in psychopathology and found that, overall, self-serving biases were
attenuated rather than reversed. It is possible that these differences are due to the extent
of depression measured. In the present study, dysphoric students were classified
utilizing a high score on the BDI-II. In this population, the positivity bias was attenuated,
but not reversed, supporting the results of Mezulis et al.’s (2004) study. It is possible that
individuals who have been diagnosed as clinically depressed would show a full
negativity bias.
The second methodological issue to be examined is the use of the Likert scale within
the construct of self-reference. This scale provided participants with two options when
classifying stimuli as non-self-referent: they could classify the item either as neutral in
relation to the self or as not related to the self at all. This neutral option allowed
individuals to rate information as neutral in relation to the self-referent rather than to the
non-self-referent. Previous research on self-reference often utilizes a two-choice reaction
time task (self/non-self) that does not include a neutral condition (Symons & Johnson,
1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Therefore, it would be interesting
for future research to attempt to include this neutral condition not only in studies
examining emotional processing but also in studies investigating self-referential
processing.
The results of the present study indicate that changes in mood states, such as
dysphoria, are associated with changes in the relationship between self-reference and
emotion. Although dysphoric individuals can identify the emotional content of stimuli
accurately, they fail to identify this emotional content when it is presented within a self-
referential context. The study illustrates the importance of further investigating the role
of self-reference within emotional disorders both within self-reference itself and when
comparing self- and other-referent processing.
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